A sham marriage or a proper wedding?: Hakeem v Hussain by Mair, J.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mair, J. (2003) A sham marriage or a proper wedding?: Hakeem v 
Hussain. Edinburgh Law Review, 7 (3). pp. 404-409. ISSN 1364-9809 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/37969/ 
 
Deposited on: 02 April 2012 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 
404 THE EDINBURGH LAW REVIEW Vol 7 2003
EdinLR Vol 5 pp 404-409
A Sham Marriage or a Proper Wedding?:
Hakeem v Hussain
A. THE BACKGROUND
The Scottish courts have considered the issue of sham marriages on relatively few
occasions and attention has focused on the trio of decisions in Orlandi,1 Mahmud2 and
Akram3 In each of these cases the facts were similar in that the parties went through
a civil marriage while holding to the belief that they would only be truly married by
religious marriage. In each, the woman subsequently sought declarator of nullity on
the basis of lack of true consent by the parties. Neither subsequent cohabitation nor
consummation of the marriage followed and in each case it emerged that there was an
ulterior motive, that being the achievement by the man of some immigration benefit
as a result of his married status. Lord Cameron in Orlandi4 held that declarator of
nullity could be granted where "it can be established that there has been no true
matrimonial consent and that the ceremony was only designed as a sham or as an
antecedent to a true marriage". This was followed in Mahmud5 and Akram,6 although
with considerable reluctance in the latter, with Lord Dunpark expressing his disquiet
that civil marriage may be used by those "whose religious faith does not acknowledge"
it and then set aside on the basis that "their religious beliefs deny that ceremony the
legal effect for which it is provided". He considered himself bound, however, by the
"consensual principle" and, while he questioned the policy of allowing parties to be
freed from marriage in this way, he conceded that it was not for the courts but for
Parliament to change the law.' In their approach to sham marriages, the Scottish courts
have differed from those in England which have consistently refused to allow parties
to escape from a sham marriage, insisting instead that they should seek a divorce.8
In the recent case ofHakeem v Hussain? the Outer House has had the opportunity,
in the absence of legislative reform, to revisit the issues surrounding sham marriage
and in his decision Lord Clarke distances himself to some extent from the previous
approach.1" He does so primarily by distinguishing the facts but there is also some
indication of a fresh approach to the dilemma presented by each of these cases, that
1 Orlandi v Castelli 1961 SC 118; 1961 SLT 118.
2 Mahmud v Mahmud 1977 SLT (Notes) 17.
3 Akram v Akram 1979 SLT (Notes) 87.
4 1961 SLT 118 at 122.
5 1977 SLT (Notes) 17.
6 1979 SLT (Notes) 87.
7 The Scottish Law Commission has recommended reform in its Report on Family Law (Scot Law Com
No 135, 1992) at para 8.20. See also Scottish Executive Parents and Children (2000) para 6.4(e) (at
www.Scotland,gpv.uk/justice/family/laiu/pac-00.asp).
8 H v H (1954) P 258; Silver v Silver (1955) 2 AU ER 614. See also E M Clive, The Law of Husband
and Wife, 4th edn (1977) at 90, para 07.051; E Sutherland, Child and Family Law (1999) at 456, para
10.46.
9 2003 SLT 515.
10 At 525-526.
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is how to balance the form against the substance—the actings of the parties against
their innermost thoughts and beliefs. There is much in the present case which can be
used to distinguish it from Orlandi," Mahmud'2 and Akram,13 and indeed from any-
ideal notion of a sham marriage, but perhaps most striking of all is the fact that the
wedding itself was captured on film—in the ubiquitous wedding video.
B. HAKEEM v HUSSAIN: THE FACTS
The facts of this case disclose two narratives—the wedding plans and the immigration
process—and it is the extent to which these are intertwined that creates the legal
issues and undoubtedly the human interest. Is this the story of young love that cools,
of a scheming man and a woman scorned, or of a carefully planned and sophisticated
sham?
Saira Hakeem, born in Scotland to parents who had come from Pakistan, raised an
action for declarator of nullity against Khalid Hussain, a young man who had come
to Scotland in early 1998 with a temporary visa, in respect of their marriage by civil
ceremony on 22 June 1998. The pursuer argued that, according to the Muslim beliefs
ofboth, neither party had regarded the civil ceremony as a true marriage and neither
party had given consent to be married. Instead, she regarded the ceremony as being
"just like 'a second engagement'"14 which they had agreed to go through as a way of
enabling the defender to obtain an extension to his visa.
A few months after his arrival in Scotland, and subsequent to a number of family
meetings arranged through a mutual acquaintance, the pursuer's mother deemed
Mr Hussain "a suitable husband" for her daughter and allowed them to meet. The
meeting was a success, the daughter pronounced herself "happy at the prospect of
having the defender as her husband", and it was concluded that each found the
"other to be attractive and that the prospect ofbeing a married couple was something
they contemplated without any difficulty".15 In the presence of family and friends a
ring was given, together with other gifts, and the happy occasion was captured in
photographic form.
After the engagement was concluded, the wedding plans commenced. As is
common in such situations, the separate preferences of both sides began to emerge
but it seemed that their various desires could, at least for the time being, be happily
accommodated. The pursuer still wished to complete her secondary education and
hoped to proceed to University. For that reason, neither she nor her mother wished her
to live with the defender in Pakistan. The problem of the expiry of his six months' visa
in August 1998 was raised and it was recognised that an extension might be obtained
if he could satisfy the immigration authorities that he and the pursuer were married
and "living together as husband and wife".1*5 On that basis the pursuer and her family
agreed that they should go through a civil wedding in the near future, which would
11 Orlandi v Castelli 1961 SC 118; 1961 SLT 118
12 Mahmud v Mahmud 1977 SLT (Notes) 17.
13 Akram v Akram 1979 SLT (Notes) 87.
14 2003 SLT 515 at 517C.
15 At516E-F.
16 At 5161.
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be followed in due course by a religious ceremony in compliance with their shared
Muslim beliefs. Only then would they be regarded according to Muslim beliefs as
husband and wife and only then would they live together.
The civil ceremony took place in Stirling on 22 June 1998 and it was for all "a special
occasion",17 complete with the trappings of the modern day wedding—the dresses,
the bridesmaids, the flowers, the part)', and, of course, the video. A special occasion
it may have been, but both nonetheless intended a subsequent religious ceremony
and only then would they consider themselves husband and wife. What followed
was a lengthy period during which, for various reasons, the religious ceremony was
postponed. In early 2000 an ultimatum was issued by the pursuer and her mother,
and in response the defender declared that he no longer wished to proceed with the
religious ceremony. The recriminations began. His motives were unclear; he denied
that his "Scottish girlfriend" was any more than a friend, but for whatever reason it
was evident that the religious ceremony would not now take place.
The wedding plans had ultimately failed, at least in the minds of the parties, but
the second story, that of the immigration process, had been successful. Following the
civil ceremony, the defender applied for and was granted an initial twelve months'
extension of his visa.1* In order to do so, he and the pursuer were required to state
that they were married and that they were living together. In October 1999, when the
defender's visa was due to expire, the defender, assisted by the pursuer, applied for
indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom.19 In February 2000 the defender
had notice of his success in the immigration process by way of a letter informing him
ofhis entitlement to remain indefinitely.2" It was this success, coupled with the collapse
soon after of the religious wedding plans, which raised the question as to whether
or not this was a sham marriage. When the pursuer and her mother sought to put
pressure on the defender to complete the religious marriage, they employed the threat
of disclosure to the immigration authorities. In June 2000 the pursuer disclosed some
detail of their relationship to the Immigration Department. In particular she told it
that she and the defender had never lived together as husband and wife and alleged
that the defender's sole purpose in going through the civil ceremony of marriage hadbeen to obtain an extension to his visa. She subsequently sought declarator of nullity
of the marriage by reason of lack of consent by both parties.
C. THE DECISION
Lord Clarke, in concluding that this was indeed a valid marriage, distinguishes it
from the situations which arose in Orlandi, Mahmud and Akram but also takes the
opportunity to restate the law21 in the terms set out by Eric Clive: "a purported
marriage, even if it is a regular marriage, is void if the parties both regard it as an
empty formality and do not consent to become husband and wife".22 Clive goes on to
17 At516K.
18 At 517-518.
19 At 518-519.
20 At519D.
21 At525K-L.
22 Law ofHusband and Wife, note 8 above, at 88, para 07.047.
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highlight the danger of two possible misinterpretations of this rule. First he emphasises
that a marriage which is entered into for an ulterior motive is not necessarily void. In
this context he draws a distinction between the situation where two parties intend to
"assume the legal relationship of husband and wife", albeit for a variety of motives or
for limited purposes, and the situation where they go through a ceremony but with
no intention to be married. The first, provided that consent is freely given, is a valid
marriage; the second is a sham. The second possibility for misinterpretation relates
to the situation where a couple go through a civil marriage but in the belief that they
will only be truly married as a result of some form of religious marriage. Clive states
clearly that "[t]he religious view which parties have of a marriage ceremony is legally
immaterial".25
The question to be asked in a case like this is whether the parties consented to be
married by civil marriage. The regular form of civil marriage as provided for by the
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 "has nothing to say about the religious significance, or
otherwise, of the parties' relationship".24 While according to the beliefs of the parties,
a civil marriage may have no religious value, the only question to be addressed by
"a judge in a secular court ... is whether or not it was a valid civil marriage".25 Thus
the assessment of the adequacy of the consent of both parties should be conducted
not within the realms of their religious faith but within the confines of civil marriage.
Did they consent to be married in terms of what civil marriage entails? The answer,
it is concluded here, was yes.
In drawing this clear distinction between civil and religious marriage, Lord Clarke
avoids the second possible misinterpretation as set out above by Clive and, in so doing,
distances himself from the decisions in Mahmud and Akram.26 While not ruling out the
potential value of legislative reform he hints that the existing law might be adequate
for modern purposes through "development and application".27
D. SEX, LIES AND THE WEDDING VIDEO
Lord Clarke cites Clive to the effect that: "Given the presumption in favour of the
validity of a regular marriage and the presumption that the parties intend the normal
and natural consequences of their acts, it would take very convincing and unequivocal
evidence to justify any other conclusion."28
It is the absence of the "normal and natural consequences" in alleged cases of sham
marriage which raise the suspicion as to the validity of the marriage and which challenge
the existence of consent. In these days of designer dresses and wedding planners, it
may seem that one of the "normal" consequences of a wedding is the wedding video
and so it was in this case. It is the video of the happy day, with the images it presents
and the fact that it allows the court to see how the couple acted on their wedding day,
which perhaps most distinguishes this case from those which have previously been
23 Law ofHusband and Wife, note 8 above, at 88, para 07.047.
24 At525H.
25 At525J.
26 At 526-527.
27 At526E.
28 Clive, Law ofHusband and Wife, note 8 above, at 88, para 07.047, cited in Hakeem at 524A-B.
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considered by the Scottish courts. In many ways, the common elements are there—a
lack of consummation or cohabitation and a pattern of deceit—but the presentation
of these elements and their perception is markedly distinct.
Hakeem is consistent with the facts of the previous cases in that there was no
cohabitation or consummation as a consequence of the civil marriage. The couple
socialised together within the company of their families—and may even have spent
some time alone—but beyond that they had no common life as might normally be
expected of husband and wife. Within the particular facts of this case, however, the
absence of these elements may be explicable. The pursuer was very young at the time
of the civil marriage and was in fact still at school. The first request for a postponement
of the religious ceremony was made by the pursuer herself, in order to enable her to
complete her school education. Far from suggesting a problem with the validity of
the marriage, the fact that the pursuer continued to live with her mother at this young
age and that the defender lived with his family, while seeking employment, might be
seen as signs of their sensible and mature approach to their individual situations and
their developing relationship.
The absence of sexual relations is also explained in terms of their religious beliefs
which were accepted as genuine.29 As with the earlier decisions in Orlandi, Mahmud
and Akram, the religious beliefs of the couple were put forward as evidence of the fact
that they had not truly consented to be husband and wife. In Hakeem, however, they
may be perceived as one of the reasons why the couple were not yet cohabiting. In
the earlier decisions there was little if any evidence of an intention to enter into sexual
relations, whereas in Hakeem the mutual attraction of the couple and their actions
in the planning of their various ceremonies and the conduct of the civil ceremony
were interpreted as signs of their intention to cohabit in the future. Lord Clarke
cites with approval3" the possibility highlighted by Clive that a couple might "intend
to be married for the purposes of civil law even if they did not regard themselves
as married for religious purposes", and the absence of sex in this case may be seen
not as a consequence of their lack of consent to be married (in civil terms) but as a
consequence of their personal understanding of marriage (in religious terms).
Lies and deceit are a common feature of all of these cases but Hakeem offers the
most detailed outline ofboth the developing relationship and the immigration process
as a background to these lies. Most obviously the defender, at times with the collusion
of the pursuer and possibly other family members and friends, lied to the immigration
authorities for the purpose of securing the right to remain in the United Kingdom.
These lies are noteworthy not only for the distinction they highlight between the
requirements of family law and immigration law but also for the way in which they
are perceived and presented by the court.
Family law concentrates to a large extent on the formation of marriage rather than
on the relationship which individual spouses may choose to develop. For immigration
purposes, however, a validly constituted marriage is insufficient without consequent
cohabitation31 and it is this difference in focus which required the parties to lie. An
29 At516J,525I.
30 At 526-527, citing Clive, Law ofHusband and Wife, note 8 above, at 88, para 07.047.
31 The Home Office requires an "intention to live permanently with the other": Statement of Changes in
Immigration Rules (HC395) para 281. See further www.ind.homeoffice.gov.uk.
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understanding of the separate concerns of family law and immigration policy is evident
in the Lord Ordinary's treatment of their lies.32 In fact in their joint deceit and in the
collusion of the pursuer there is some sign of a common matrimonial pursuit: "at the
end of the day my purposes were to marry him and to stay with him so I didn't have
no [sic] reason not to sign it".33
In Akrum,34 Lord Dunpark stated that it is "contra bonos mores to annul a marriage
which is solemnly constituted in a registry office" but where the parties are in effect
deceiving the registrar as to their intent. In Hakeem, the issue of lying to the registrar
is avoided by concentrating on the consent of the parties to a civil marriage. An
underlying doubt remains, however, in the facts of the case as to the honesty of the
defender, expressed in the view of the pursuer and her mother who were "clearly
hurt by the defender's attitude and considered him to have been guilty of a deep
breach of trust".35
The legal implications of this decision may take some time to be clarified. It
represents a very clear approval of the law as stated by Clive, avoiding as it does the
pitfalls which he has highlighted. It also hints that long-awaited reform may not be
necessary and that decisions, which are no longer in line with the English courts or
perhaps with immigration policy, may be reinterpreted. What is beyond doubt is
that the facts of this case, and most of all the photographic evidence of those facts,
make it stand out from the others. Not only did the ceremony comply with the legal
requirements set out in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, but the wedding also
complied with modern etiquette, captured for posterity by both video and photographs
which "present graphically an image of the occasion being a happy and special family
occasion where those attending have taken particular care over their dress and where
the attitudes struck were what one would see at any wedding ceremony"."5 The camera
never lies? The couple certainly had a proper wedding although their true consent tobe husband and wife remains uncertain. In judging the legal validity of their marriage,
the court too has chosen to focus on their outward compliance with formalities rather
than on their innermost thoughts. In a modern legal setting, with clear rules on civilformation of marriage, that may indeed be the proper thing to do.
Jane Mair
Senior Lecturer in Law
University of Glasgow
32 At 517-519.
33 At 5171.
34 1979 SLT (Notes) 87 at 88.
35 At519J.
36 At516L.
